In 2013, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno, Marine Corps Commandant General James Amos, and commander of US Special Operations Command Admiral William McRaven cosigned a document that should have grabbed the attention of the entire American defense establishment. Its central observation was unambiguous: The Pentagon’s concept of competition does not reflect the fundamental reality that “competition and conflict are about people.” A decade later, the Army proposed cutting its special operations forces by up to 20 percent. The defense establishment continued its decade-long debate about whether irregular warfare capabilities are still needed at all. The warning from three four-star generals produced no durable institutional change. Why?

In a class on Communicating in a Global Society, Zia brought chopsticks and rice to class rather than slides — using the simple act of learning to use unfamiliar tools as a vehicle for exploring the dynamics of public diplomacy, cultural humility, and how the discomfort of unfamiliarity shapes how nations and peoples relate to one another.

The convergence of rapid technological proliferation, economic globalization, and liquidity in democratic institutions has disaggregated key coercive capabilities of the state to subnational political agents and non-state actors. These groups can now achieve political objectives by exploiting the rapid feedback mechanisms of modern democratic societies through the targeted use of force designed to manipulate electoral outcomes.

In an age saturated with images of war and algorithmically amplified despair, a monkey named “Punch” at a Japanese zoo has quietly emerged as a transnational language of affection and shared humanity — and an unexpected case study in soft power, public diplomacy, and the persuasive power of innocence in a moment when such emotions are increasingly scarce.

As competition with China intensifies around Taiwan, Mahanian orthodoxy — dominance through decisive battle and control of sea lanes — may be dangerously outdated. China’s military modernization has included pervasive surveillance, deception, and cyber warfare. Naval power today is a contest of perception, ambiguity, and information control. McNeil draws on Corbettian sea power theory to argue for a counterintelligence-informed approach to naval strategy.

Drawing on Walter Lippmann’s insight that the public lives through mediated images rather than direct contact with reality, Zia examines how YouTube has become a stage for soft power projection — where algorithms, influencers, and digital narratives translate lived experience for millions, blurring the boundary between the world outside and the pictures in our heads.

The fusion of legitimate state power and organized criminal activity in the maritime domain creates a hybrid threat that is as dangerous for those targeted as it is deniable for those who undertake it. Russia’s shadow fleet deliberately exploits loopholes in maritime legal frameworks, preventing definitive attribution and insulating the state from diplomatic, legal, or military response — leaving existing deterrence and response mechanisms paralyzed.

Within the DoD, the term “campaigning” has been applied so broadly that it has diluted its meaning and led to confusion in planning and execution. McNeil argues that project management frameworks from the private sector — defined scope, clear roles, outcome-focused planning — can restore discipline to DoD campaign design, using Defense Counterintelligence Campaigns as a representative case study.

Approaching the world not to dominate, defend, or decorate — but to discern. Rolander and Zia argue that effective diplomacy requires contextual fluency: the ability to read the layered historical, cultural, and relational conditions that shape every negotiation and partnership. The diplomat perceives the world as a delicate tapestry, each thread a relationship, each knot a moment in history.

With over 95% of international data traversing undersea fiber-optic cables, the security of this submerged infrastructure has become inseparable from global economic stability, information dominance, and strategic resilience. Rolander calls for multilayered defensive strategies — enhanced monitoring, international cooperation, physical cable hardening, and credible diplomatic pressure — to reduce both the likelihood and impact of undersea infrastructure attacks.

While intelligence is undoubtedly an asset in diplomatic efforts and provides the lens through which a diplomat interprets global events, it is not the sole determinant of success. Rolander and Zia challenge the Hughes-Olson thesis that effective diplomacy depends significantly on effective intelligence, arguing that effective statecraft requires relational, contextual, and cultural dimensions that intelligence alone cannot supply.

In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, Military Sealift Command would be responsible for transporting 90% of Army and Marine Corps equipment into theater — but readiness levels have dropped to just 59%. Aging vessels, insufficient mariner availability, and systemic underinvestment mean the U.S. could lose 1–2 million square feet of sealift capacity annually. Rolander calls for urgent fleet recapitalization, renewed shipbuilding investment, and robust theater-level training exercises.

The relationship between Indigenous Peoples and national defence institutions is complex and often contentious, shaped by historical conflicts, systemic marginalization, and evolving cultural identities. Examining how the New Zealand Defence Force has integrated Indigenous Māori culture, McNeil draws lessons for the U.S. Department of Defense in addressing its own fraught history with Indigenous Nations — marked by centuries of warfare, broken treaties, and persistent struggles for recognition.

This paper examines the positioning of counterintelligence as a supported J3 fires function rather than an organic J2 supporting intelligence function. McNeil argues that because of the proactive and dynamic nature of CI activities, it may be better positioned under J3 — allowing CI to operate offensively and defensively across multiple domains, including cyber operations, OSINT, special operations, and foreign intelligence disciplines. The paper provides a case for integration using real-world U.S. Army case studies.

The U.S. Marine Corps is undergoing transformative restructuring through Force Design 2030, developing Marine Littoral Regiments for high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific. By divesting legacy systems, investing in advanced technologies, and embracing distributed operations through small, mobile, hard-to-detect units, the Corps is returning to its amphibious roots while positioning itself as a rapid-reaction force capable of projecting power in contested multi-domain environments.

Yemen’s Houthi militants have successfully employed long-range precision fires and low-cost drones to deny sea control in the Red Sea — offering unconventional lessons for the U.S. Army. Rolander argues that by leveraging Strategic Mid-Range Fires, Multi-Domain Task Forces, and DARPA drone initiatives, the Army can project power from dispersed island positions and contribute meaningfully to maritime campaigns in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite the established benefits of cognitive interviewing for enhancing witness recall accuracy and reducing false confessions, adoption at the local law enforcement level lags significantly behind federal practices. McNeil identifies the main barriers — resource limitations, training deficiencies, and cultural resistance — and recommends comprehensive training programs, legislative mandates, and national standards for investigative practices to promote broader adoption.